



**SERBIAN  
WORLD**  
Borrowed  
concept

# INTRODUCTION

Serbia's contemporary regional posture increasingly mirrors core features of Russia's strategy toward its near abroad: a formal rhetoric of good-neighbourly relations paired with persistent, multidimensional interference in the internal affairs of neighbouring states. While Belgrade publicly emphasizes dialogue, stability, and EU-compatible cooperation, in practice, it deploys a calibrated mix of political, informational, cultural-religious, security, and economic instruments designed to preserve leverage, constrain sovereign decision-making, and shape the identity space of neighbouring societies. Nowhere is this dual track more visible than in Montenegro, whose 2006 restoration of independence reconfigured Serbia's strategic depth and triggered a long-horizon effort to retain influence over Montenegrin institutions, media ecosystems, and public narratives.

The ideological frame for this effort is an updated iteration of the 1990s "Greater Serbia" project, rebranded as the "Serbian World" (Srpski svet). Functionally analogous to Russia's "Russkiy Mir," it seeks the political and cultural unification of Serbs across borders under Belgrade's gravitational pull—less through overt force than through hybrid instruments that blur the line between soft power and coercive influence. This paradigm normalizes extra-territorial claims over identity, history, language, and culture, creating a pretext for continual involvement in neighbours' domestic debates about nationhood, sovereignty, and geopolitical alignment.

Operationally, the approach relies on information manipulation and coordinated hybrid actions. Narrative warfare, amplified through pro-government media, proxy portals, partisan influencers, and cross-platform brigading, works to delegitimize Euro-Atlantic orientations, depict local institutions as captured or hostile to Serb identity, and frame Serbia as the indispensable protector of regional "stability." These narratives often travel with disinformation and intimidation campaigns that exploit existing societal cleavages, turning cultural and religious issues into high-salience political conflicts.

Belgrade's influence architecture is executed through different channels: political parties; the instrumentalization of the Serbian Orthodox Church's authority and infrastructure; loyalist media networks, security and intelligence linkages, and veterans'/paramilitary milieus; cultural, educational.

In Montenegro, this model manifests as a sustained contest over identity and sovereignty, disputes about language, church property, historical narratives, and foreign-policy orientation that are repeatedly reignited to limit policy autonomy and slow EU accession. The outcome is a chronic volatility in which elections, legislative agendas, and security appointments are influenced not only by domestic competition but by a persistent external actor shaping the information environment and coalition arithmetic.

## Expanding the Overton Window

The primary vector for the shifts in Montenegrin society is historical revisionism powered by disinformation. Narratives that negate or relativize Montenegrin language, nationhood, and statehood are presented as legitimate cultural and historical debate. Factual baselines are steadily inverted: the history of Montenegrin independence is portrayed as an aberration, linguistic standardization as political fabrication, and the modern state as an artificial project. In parallel, the line between church and state is blurred through the elevation of clerical authority as a supra-political arbiter of national authenticity, embedding ecclesiastical influence into civic decisions and public education under the rhetoric of heritage protection. This identity architecture is reinforced by the selective glorification of figures implicated in wartime atrocities, from the Second World War through the Yugoslav conflicts of the 1990s, thereby rehabilitating radical traditions as “patriotic”.<sup>1</sup> Genocide denial regarding Srebrenica and the erection or advocacy of monuments to war criminals function as performative tests of the new normal.<sup>2</sup> With this, they force institutions either to acquiesce or to pay a political cost for defending truth. Where the response is delayed, or framed as “both sides have their narrative”, the Overton window widens another notch.

This process advances not only because of active propaganda, but also because of passive governance: the absence of timely state sanction, the relativization by segments of the ruling elite, and the muted reaction from parts of civil society cumulatively signal that the cost of radicalization is low. Each unchallenged provocation—an ahistorical school booklet, a “cultural” panel that launders denialism, a municipal ceremony honoring wartime perpetrators—teaches the public to tolerate what yesterday was intolerable. Media ecosystems amplify the drift through format and tone: As exposure becomes routine, citizens habituate; what once shocked now merely irritates, then bores, and finally passes as an unremarkable part of the landscape.

A second, complementary frame for expanding the window is the instrumentalization of “traditional” and “family values”.<sup>3</sup> Marketed as moral common sense, this narrative is a political tool for narrowing civic space, stigmatizing minorities, and delegitimizing liberal-democratic institutions as alien to “our way of life”. The formula is consistent: cast Euro-Atlantic commitments as corrosive to faith and family; label independent media and NGOs as foreign agents; depict rule-of-law reforms as threats to sovereignty; and equate dissent with betrayal. The result is a values-based veto over democratic pluralism that nudges the public to see illiberal measures not as exceptional, but as prudent guardianship.

Taken together, revisionist history and “values” politics form a pincer movement on Montenegro’s democratic consensus. One arm erodes factual foundations—language, identity, sovereignty—while the other moralizes illiberal governance as virtue. The effect is visible: denialism about Srebrenica no longer disqualifies; public praise of wartime perpetrators draws less outrage; clerical authority increasingly arbitrates civic disputes; and pro-authoritarian initiatives appear with little sanction. Each of these outcomes is evidence of a successfully shifted Overton window—radical ideas rendered ordinary through repetition, provocation, and institutional inaction. If unaddressed, the long-term consequence is a polity accustomed to anti-democratic norms and progressively desensitized to attacks on its Euro-Atlantic orientation.

## Channels of influence

Serbia projects influence in Montenegro through a coordinated network of proxies. At the center is the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC), which provides the ideological framework—history, language, identity—for the network’s other components. Around this core operate aligned political parties, media outlets, extremist formations, and a set of NGOs and cultural associations. The channels are mutually reinforcing and organized to affect electoral behavior, policy agendas, and the broader information environment.

In practice, the SOC is the dominant extra-institutional actor in Montenegro. Following the death of Metropolitan Amfilohije, the Belgrade Patriarchate has asserted more direct hierarchical control over the Montenegrin branch, narrowing its operational autonomy and advancing a unitary Serbian ecclesiastical agenda.<sup>4</sup> SOC initiatives increasingly intersect with public policy domains—property regulation, education content, cultural programming, and municipal ceremonies—often in ways that contradict Montenegro’s EU-accession obligations on secular governance, non-discrimination, and institutional independence. The close cooperation between senior clergy and party leaders further erodes the constitutional separation of church and state and provides religious justification for partisan positions.

Several political structures maintain close, public ties with Serbia’s leadership. The “For the Future of Montenegro” coalition—built around New Serbian Democracy and the Democratic People’s Party and led by current parliamentary speaker Andrija Mandić—demonstrates both ideological alignment with President Aleksandar Vučić and operational cooperation with the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS).<sup>5</sup> This was particularly visible during electoral campaigns such as those in Nikšić.<sup>6</sup>

Media is a primary vector for narrative penetration. The media scene in Montenegro is characterized by the presence of various media outlets whose content and editorial policies are shaped by the political and ideological preferences of their owners, who are predominantly foreign actors. Although media pluralism is desirable in developed democratic countries, the type of pluralism prevalent in Montenegrin media contributes to the further polarization of Montenegrin society. In Montenegro, foreign malign influence through the media poses a serious challenge to sovereignty, social stability, and democratic processes in the country. Media manipulation and the influence of foreign actors in the media sphere can significantly impact the integrity of the Montenegrin media environment, creating confusion among the general public and undermining their trust in journalism. The absence of a language barrier enables Serbian tabloids and pro-government broad-

casters to reach Montenegrin audiences at scale. Belgrade-based branches of Russian state media (e.g., Sputnik Srbija and RT initiatives) complement this with regionally tailored content. Inside Montenegro, several pro-Serbian outlets replicate frames originating in Serbian tabloids or Russian sources, contributing to a high-velocity disinformation ecosystem. Ownership structures exacerbate these risks, every commercial television station with national broadcasting licenses in Montenegro has majority ownership links to Serbian capital, creating incentives for editorial alignment with Belgrade’s priorities and constraining the space for independent journalism.<sup>7</sup>

Extremist and nationalist groups constitute an additional channel. The strong influence of Serbia, particularly the influence of the Serbian Orthodox Church on socio-political events in Montenegro, is reflected in the strengthening of far-right ideologies with a Serbian orientation. The far-right in Montenegro operates on identical principles as in Serbia.<sup>8</sup> The political space of the right wing in Montenegro is covered by numerous pro-Serbian and pro-Russian groups draped in the cloak of traditional Orthodox values, historical heritage, and old alliances, which have been dominant in influencing political processes since 2020. Serbian far-right networks and “Orthodox brotherhoods” maintain porous links with segments of the SOC and sympathetic political actors, mobilizing during protests and high-tension events. In Montenegro, affiliations with Russia-aligned formations such as the Night Wolves and Cossack associations further embed a transnational, security-adjacent dimension consistent with the “Serbian World” agenda.<sup>9</sup> These groups raise the perceived costs of dissent, shape public order around identity issues, and provide rapid mobilization capacity outside formal institutions.

A final layer consists of NGOs, cultural organisations. Under the banner of promoting Serbian culture and language, many programs advance historical revisionism, dispute Montenegrin distinctiveness, and campaign against curricula or memorial policies that affirm Montenegro’s statehood and civic identity.<sup>10</sup>

The effectiveness of this architecture lies in

its coordination. The SOC sets the normative frame, political actors translate it into legislative and electoral leverage, media saturates the environment with consistent narratives, extremist groups provide street-level pressure, and NGOs institutionalize themes through routine programming. The cumulative result is measurable: secular constitutional norms are weakened, external loyalty claims are mainstreamed in electoral discourse, the information space privileges identity conflict over policy performance, and public institutions adapt to pressure rather than uphold standards. This is a systemic approach designed to keep Montenegro within Serbia's cultural and political orbit while minimizing overt attribution and raising the costs of resistance for pro-reform actors.

## Case study – Census in Montenegro

The 2023 population census in Montenegro, postponed from its regular decennial cycle by the pandemic and ultimately conducted from 3–28 December 2023, became a focal point for a coordinated influence operation centered in Belgrade and amplified by proxy actors inside Montenegro. Rather than a neutral statistical exercise, the census was framed by pro-Serbian political, religious, media, and civic networks as a referendum on identity.<sup>11</sup> This reframing transformed a technical process into a high-stakes contest over the constitutional order, language policy, and the future balance between a civic state and ethno-national claims. The overarching strategic aim—visible across messaging, mobilization, and narrative engineering—was to expand the share of citizens declaring as Serb, speaking Serbian, and affiliating with the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC), then leverage those “new demographic facts” to push for constitutional and legal changes in Montenegro.

Serbian political leadership elevated the census to a matter of “vital interest,” repeatedly asserting that Serbs in Montenegro are structurally disadvantaged relative to other minorities in neighboring states.<sup>12</sup> This line, paired with claims that previous

counts were “not free”, legitimized open campaigning about how Montenegrin citizens should self-identify. It also prepared the ground for subsequent demands to revise the Constitution (e.g., language status) should the measured share of Serbs rise. Serbian government proposed free education, healthcare and voluntary military service for those who identify as Serbs, speak the Serbian language, and go to the SOC on the population census.<sup>13</sup>

Montenegrin pro-Serbian parties synchronized with this framing. Their leaders and allied commentators openly anticipated that, after the 2020 political turnover and the 2023 count, census results would “confirm” a Serbian identity restoration and warrant a constitutional realignment—from civic to ethno-national premises—with Serbian language privileges central to the agenda.<sup>14</sup> Such pre-commitments expressly politicized the output of a statistical instrument; census results were cast in advance as a mandate for redesigning the state.

The SOC acted as a central mobilizer. Despite public claims from individual clergy that the Church did not agitate on census choices<sup>15</sup>, senior hierarchs—including the Patriarch—used sermons and mass gatherings in Podgorica to urge citizens to “decisively express” a Serbian identity, language, and faith.<sup>16</sup> Local bishops amplified the same message, reframing census declarations as a moral and spiritual duty.<sup>17</sup>

The effect was to collapse the boundary between religious exhortation and political mobilization, re-asserting the Church as a gatekeeper of national belonging and a legitimating voice for constitutional change. Far-right groups aligned with the SOC extended this campaign online, circulating falsified “historical” numbers from early-20th-century counts to manufacture a lineage of overwhelming Serbian self-identification in Montenegro.<sup>18</sup> In reality, those censuses did not even record national affiliation, only citizenship and religion—illustrating how historical revisionism operated as an instrument to naturalize a preferred present outcome.

The media ecosystem functioned as the operation's amplifier and normalizer.

Pro-government Serbian tabloids, together with Belgrade-based branches of Russian state media (Sputnik, RT Balkan), saturated coverage with sensational headlines about “suppressed” Serbian identity, alleged enumeration irregularities, and claims that the West sought to block the census out of fear of a Serbian surge.<sup>19</sup> The goal was twofold: raise emotional temperature among audiences and assert the existence of an unstoppable demographic tide. These outlets also laundered “results” mid-process via a custom poll on nationality, religion, and language—allowing RT Balkan to narrate a Montenegro “remembering its origins” before any official release, a classic tactic for pre-legitimizing a desired narrative arc.<sup>20</sup> Local pro-Serbian portals mirrored and extended these pipelines. IN4S and Borba ran billboard and content campaigns (“Proud of Our Serbdom,” among others)<sup>21</sup> and, in Borba’s case, published purported preliminary census outcomes two days after counting ended—claims subsequently echoed by multiple Serbian tabloids even though the statistical office only announced preliminary totals (population, households, dwellings) a month later.<sup>22</sup> This coordinated “fait accompli” approach primed the public to treat an uplift in Serb identifiers as already established, making any later contestation appear as denialism. Beyond legacy media, newly reactivated associations presented as civic and “cultural” vehicles undertook targeted social media advertising during the census window. Their creative strategy blended historical appropriation (recasting canonical Montenegrin figures as Serbs), identity cues, and simple slogans (“Let’s be what our ancestors were”) to normalize three declarations as a bundle: Serb nationality, SOC religiosity, and Serbian language.<sup>23</sup> The sequencing of page creation, sponsorship, and cross-following with aligned political brands suggests a curated funnel intended to reach less politicized audiences quickly during the enumeration period.

Pro-Serbian organizations also mobilized minors and families through “camps,” study opportunities, and ceremonial visits to Serbian institutions, projecting Serbia as a protective “motherland” and making the boundary between cultural outreach and political recruitment deliberately porous.<sup>24</sup> These soft-power gestures anchored the

census narrative in everyday incentives and experiences.

Cumulatively, these vectors—political, clerical, media, civic—shifted the Overton window around several previously contentious claims: that Montenegro is “naturally” Serb in identity; that Serbian language should enjoy official status above Montenegrin; that the Church is entitled to instruct citizens in civic self-declaration; and that constitutional redesign to reflect an elevated Serb share is an expected, even overdue, adjustment. Arguments that once registered as radical were repositioned as reasonable responses to “updated demographic reality,” with the census presented as the neutral arbiter that now compels change. That logic inverts the census’s purpose: instead of data informing policy in a civic frame, policy goals drive identity signaling to engineer the data.

The census episode illustrates a template of influence that fuses three elements. First, a **narrative spine**—Serbs in Montenegro are endangered; past counts were manipulated; the 2023 census is the “first free” chance to correct history—runs through political speeches, church sermons, media packages, and civic campaigns. Second, **cross-domain synchronization** ensures that messages are delivered by multiple, mutually reinforcing authorities: presidents, patriarchs, MPs, rectors, editors, and “cultural” NGOs. Third, **policy capture by data narrative** converts identity signaling at the household level into a claimed mandate to rewrite language status and the constitutional settlement.

# CONCLUSION

This paper has shown that Serbia's regional posture combines cooperative rhetoric with sustained interference, increasingly modeled on Russia's approach to its neighborhood. The result in Montenegro is not episodic pressure but a structured system that fuses political, clerical, media, civic, and security-adjacent instruments to shape domestic choices and constrain policy autonomy. By recoding identity debates as matters of "protection" and "correction," these efforts turn routine democratic processes into arenas for extra-territorial leverage.

A central finding is the systematic widening of what is treated as acceptable in public life. Through revisionist claims about language, history, and statehood, and through the elevation of church authority in civic matters, ideas that once sat at the margins now circulate as mainstream options. This shift has practical effects: it normalizes denialism, lowers the cost of extremist signaling, and reintroduces confessional gatekeeping into policy domains that should remain secular and evidence-based.

The proxy architecture that enables this shift is coherent and mutually reinforcing. The 2023 census crystallized these trends. What should have been a technical count was reframed as a plebiscite on identity, with external political, religious, and media actors encouraging self-declarations and treating anticipated outcomes as a mandate for constitutional change. This case illustrates a broader playbook: engineer the information environment, prime the public with "pre-results," then convert claimed demographic shifts into arguments for revising the civic settlement.

Looking forward, the risk is cumulative. Left unaddressed, the same tools used to contest language, and history will be applied to education standards, memorial policy, public administration, and security appointments. Over time, institutional responses calibrated to avoid confrontation can produce a de facto acceptance of standards that are neither democratic nor

aligned with Montenegro's European commitments. The consequence is a steady dilution of sovereignty—not in formal competencies, but in the ability to set and enforce rules on a civic basis.

Mitigation requires moving beyond reactive fact-checks. Priority lines of effort include enforcing the constitutional separation of church and state; tightening transparency and competition rules in the media market (especially ownership and syndication); safeguarding the neutrality of statistical and electoral processes; and building strategic communications that reinforce civic identity without mirroring polarizing tactics. Regional coordination is essential, given the cross-border nature of the networks described here, as is consistent engagement by EU and allied partners conditioned on rule-of-law performance rather than short-term political expediency.

Progress should be measured with verifiable indicators: reductions in cross-border political assistance to parties and campaigns; audited transparency of media ownership and content-sharing arrangements; compliance checks on public-sector neutrality in education and culture; and independent monitoring of disinformation volumes and sources. Clear benchmarks create accountability and help separate genuine pluralism from proxy-driven manipulation.

In sum, the challenge is strategic, not episodic. Serbia's influence model in Montenegro is designed to be deniable, resilient, and iterative. Meeting it effectively means reinforcing civic institutions, raising the cost of interference, and protecting the information space so that political competition returns to questions of governance and performance rather than identity management. Done consistently, these measures will narrow the space for extra-territorial leverage and restore the primacy of democratic choice.

# Recommendations



## Primary Focus on the European Integration Process

Key political decision-makers must consistently direct attention and resources toward fulfilling the conditions for joining the European Union. Otherwise, shifting the focus away from the process of European integration could lead to destabilization and further weakening of social cohesion in Montenegro.



## Strengthening State Institutions in Support of Secularism and Civic Values

A key priority is to strengthen the capacity of state institutions to reduce the influence of religious organizations on political and social processes, preserving the secular and civic character of Montenegrin society. Institutions must act proactively to prevent possible influences that could threaten social cohesion and the state's neutrality in religious matters.



## Improving Oversight Mechanisms in Culture and Education

The Parliament of Montenegro must intensify its control and oversight mechanisms in the fields of culture and education, considering the potentially harmful foreign influences that could have long-term negative impacts on the country's identity and stability. By strengthening these mechanisms, it is necessary to ensure the protection of Montenegro's cultural identity and the integrity of the educational system, which are the foundations of a civic and democratic society.



## Strengthening Institutional Capacities to Combat Disinformation Narratives

It is essential to strengthen institutional capacities to counter anti-Western disinformation narratives through coordinated efforts by state institutions, regulators, and expert bodies. Regulators play a key role in developing policies that sanction disinformation and promote transparency in media and on social networks. Additionally, there is a need for continuous enhancement of citizens' media and digital literacy to help them recognize and reject manipulative content.

# Reference

- 1 Rudović B., "Kip ratnog zločinca "šeta" državom: Spomenik Pavlu Đurišiću premješten u konak manastira Đurđevi stupovi", 23.08.2025., Vijesti, dostupno na: <https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/771789/kip-ratnog-zlocinca-seta-drzavom-spomenik-pavlu-djurisicu-premjesten-u-konak-manastira-djurdjevi-stupovi>
- 2 Mitrović J., "Crna Gora epicentar relativizacije genocida u Srebrenici", 16.07.2025., Pobjeda, dostupno na: <https://www.pobjeda.me/clanak/crna-gora-epicentar-relativizacije-genocida-u-srebrenici>
- 3 "Joanikije: Srbi i Crnogorci u Crnoj Gori su braća i to je svima jasno", 07.01.2024., Politika, dostupno na: <https://www.politika.rs/sr/clanak/593044/joanikije-srbi-i-crnogorci-u-crnoj-gori-su-braca-i-to-je-svima-jasno>
- 4 Zečević N., "Poništeno svo Amfilohijevo nasljeđe, Mitropolija bez uticaja u Srpskoj pravoslavnoj crkvi", 06.08.2022., Pobjeda, Dostupno na: <https://www.cdm.me/politika/ponisteno-svo-amfilohijevo-nasljeđe-mitropolija-bez-uticaja-u-srpskoj-pravoslavnoj-crkvi/>
- 5 Janković S., "Oštre osude zbog prisustva šefa Skupštine Crne Gore Vučićevoj proslavi izborne pobjede", 17.12.2023., Radio Slobodna Evropa, Dostupno na: <https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/andrija-mandic-vucic-izborna-pobjeda/32735889.html>
- 6 Stojanović M., "Proterani funkcioneri SNS - turisti ili politička podrška na izborima u Nikšiću?", 12.02.2021., N1, Dostupno na: <https://n1info.rs/vesti/proterani-funkcioneri-sns-turisti-ili-politicka-podrska-na-izborima-u-niksicu/>
- 7 Šćepanović L., "Od pet crnogorskih televizija četiri u vlasništvu struktura iz Srbije", 06.01.2022., Radio Slobodna Evropa, dostupno na: <https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/crna-gora-mediji-vlasnistvo-srbija/31642265.html>
- 8 " Čija je naša ekstremna desnica?", 13.10.2022, CDM, dostupno na: <https://www.cdm.me/politika/dfc-analiza-cija-je-nasa-eskremna-desnica-2/>
- 9 Šćepanović L., Zabrana 'Noćnih vukova' u Crnoj Gori?, 08.08.2022., Radio Slobodna Evropa, dostupno na: <https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/anb-inicijativa-zabrana-rada-organizacije-nocni-vukovi-u-crnoj-gori/31979024.html>
- 10 B.H., Politička agenda iza kulture - nevladine organizacije kao promoteri etnonacionalizma, 29.11.2024., Vijesti, Dostupno na: <https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/734676/dfc-politicka-agenda-iza-kulture-nevladine-organizacije-kao-promoteri-etnonacionalizma>
- 11 Redakcija Pobjede, Popis stanovništva: Između statistike i politike, 22.09.2023. Pobjeda, dostupno na: <https://www.pobjeda.me/clanak/popis-stanovnistva-izmedu-statistike-i-politike>
- 12 Redakcija Pobjede, Vučić: Izbori u Crnoj Gori važni, ali važniji popis 2021. Godine, 26.08.2020., Pobjeda, dostupno na: <https://www.pobjeda.me/clanak/vucic-izbori-u-crnoj-gori-vazni-ali-vazniji-popis-2021-godine>
- 13 D.C., Studenti iz Crne Gore na sastanku u Vladi Srbije: "Popisnica da bude dokaz za besplatno školovanje", 26.10.2023, Vijesti, Dostupno na: <https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/drustvo/679296/studenti-iz-crne-gore-na-sastanku-u-vladi-srbije-popisnica-da-bude-dokaz-za-besplatno-skolovanje>
- 14 Kadić V., POSLE POPISA I RAZGOVORI O JEZIKU Mandić za "Novosti" - I na prebrojavanju koje je organizovao bivši režim najveći broj ljudi govorio srpski, 16.1.2023, Novosti, Dostupno na: <https://www.novosti.rs/crna-gora/vesti/1305780/posle-popisa-razgovori-jeziku-mandic-novosti-prebrojavanju-koje-organizovao-bivsi-rezim-najveci-broj-ljudi-govorilo-srpski>
- 15 Perović: SPC nije agitovala pred popis, na našim skupovima ne širi se antidržavni uticaj, 17.01.2024, Portal Analitika, Dostupno na: <https://www.portalanalitika.me/clanak/perovic-spc-nije-agitovala-pred-popis-na-nasim-skupovima-ne-siri-se-antidrzavni-uticaj>
- 16 Милица Ђурђевић Стаменковски, Fejsbuk profil, 08.10.2023, Dostupno na: <https://www.facebook.com/100044314935373/posts/895150915305398>
- 17 Jevandjelje na srpski način: Metodije potvrdio da u eparhiji za pravoslavce računa samo Srbe, 19.10.2023, Portal Analitika, Dostupno na: <https://www.portalanalitika.me/clanak/jevandjelje-na-srpski-nacin-metodije-potvrdio-da-u-eparhiji-za-pravoslavce-racuna-samo-srbe>
- 18 Завјетници Тврдош Никшић, Fejsbuk stranica, 02.12.2023, Dostupno na: <https://web.archive.org/web/20240119081334/https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=332924072707972&set=a.229781749688872>
- 19 Trklja M., Прекрштају Србе у Црногорце: Преvara на попису по Миловим методама, 06.12.2023, Sputnik Srbija, Dostupno na: <https://sputnikportal.rs/20231206/prekrstaju-srbe-ucrnogorce-prevara-na-popisu-po-milovim-metodama-1164731535.html>
- 20 Vuković A., РТ Балкан истраживање: Већина Црногораца прича српски, Јоаникију верују више него Милатовићу, 16.10.2023, RT Balkan, Dostupno na: <https://rt.rs/srbija-i-balkan/67128-crna-gora-istrazivanje-rezultati-stavovi-demografija/>
- 21 Билборди „Поносни на своје српско“ осванули у Српској Боки!, октобар 2023, IN4S, Dostupno na: <https://www.in4s.net/foto-bilbordi-ponosni-na-svoje-srpsko-osvanuli-u-srpskoj-boki/>
- 22 Rezultati popisa na uzorku od 80 odsto prebrojanog materijala: Srbi bilježe najveći rast u odnosu na 2011, srpskim jezikom govori većina stanovništva, 03.12.2023, Borba, Dostupno na: <https://borba.me/rezultati-popisa-na-uzorku-od-80-odsto-prebrojanog-materijala-srbi-biljeze-najveci-rast-u-odnosu-na-2011-srpskim-jezikom-govori-vecina-stanovnistva/>
- 23 Sinanović S., Povratak vidovdanskej etici u Crnoj Gori, 02.10.2020, Novi standard, Dostupno na: <https://standard.rs/2020/10/02/mi-znamo-ko-smo-povratak-vidovdanskej-etici-u-crnoj-gori/>
- 24 Novovic B., U Nikšiću otvorena ljetnja škola srpskog jezika za strance, 10.07.2023, Sputnik Srbija, Dostupno na: <https://lat.sputnikportal.rs/20230710/u-niksicu-otvorena-ljetnja-skola-srpskog-jezika-za-strance-1158307690.html>

