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DEMOCRATISATION IN EU EXTERNAL POLICIES

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

PRAGUE, 22-23 SEPTEMBER, 2006

THE ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

(Asociace pro mezinárodní otázky, AMO) is a Czech non-governmental organisation that conducts research and educational programmes in the field of international affairs, and both Czech and European foreign and security policy. AMO, established in 1995, is currently one of the leading institutions of its kind in the Czech Republic.

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DEMOCRATISATION IN EU EXTERNAL POLICIES:

Objective or Side-effect?

CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS

Prague, 22–23 September 2006

Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic



asociace pro mezinárodní otázky
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Democratisation in EU External Policies: Objective or Side-effect?

Conference Proceedings

Compiled by *Roisin Joyce*, edited by *Jan Šnidauf*

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Democratisation in EU External Policies: Objective or Side-effect?
International conference

Under the auspices of
Hon. Edvard Outrata
Vice-President of the Senate

Organised by
Association for International Affairs

in cooperation with
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Prague

with kind support of
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic
Representation of the European Commission in Prague
European Foundation for Democracy
Union of European Federalists
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WORD OF GREETINGS

// EDVARD OUTRATA

Vice-President of the Senate

The question asked in the title of this conference implies that it is obvious that the practical effects of European integration lead to an unprecedented extension and deepening of democracy in Europe's neighbourhood. As the European Community and later the Union have expanded, so has democracy in this part of the world. This is so much the case that Europeans are even starting to forget that only recently Europe was known as a cradle not only of democracy, but also of many an ideological justification of the

worst dictatorships. Not so long ago, copying European practices could mean building military or ideological dictatorships as easily as it could mean sowing the seeds of democracy. This dangerous period ended in two world wars caused by European antagonisms. And the peril was great; who knows where democracy would have ended had it not been saved in Europe by US intervention and permanent sponsorship?

The prime responsibility that immediate post-war European leaders felt was toward ensuring permanent peace on the continent, and the method they used was developing economic interdependence among democratic states. Their success in the ensuing half century or more has been phenomenal and fully proved their original theses. Among them was one that we take for granted today, namely that democracies lead by their nature to prosperity and the maintenance of peace.

The influence of the example of this obvious success on neighbours was very strong from early on. Other powers and ideologies waned and collapsed as more peoples were allowed to choose democracy and integration with the European Community and Union. At the same time, both economical and political interests of the EC and EU implied the propagation of democracy, the root of the emerging integrated Europe's success.

And now we ask: was this an objective, a willful aim of EU's policies, or did it happen by osmosis, simply because it was and is so clearly the right way to go for most people around? Clearly, both is in some measure true. In the detailed experience of these years, however, many insights into the process can be gained, and this is going to be the contents of our deliberations.

I think we will not conclude clearly one way or the other, because it is surely a chicken and egg situation. But if we cherish democracy and its benefits in our territory, peace and prosperity among them, we will help to keep the integration process going, allowing more and more peoples to gain its results.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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The international conference „**Democratisation in EU External Policies: Objective or Side-effect?**“ was held in the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic in Prague, 22–23 September 2006. This two-day conference was another event in the growing series of Annual Conferences organised by the Association for International Affairs (AMO). The realisation of the conference was made possible by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation Prague and other partners.

The event brought together academics, politicians, officials, policy-makers, and representatives of European institutions, as well as people from the NGO sector in the EU, its eastern and southern neighbours and the USA. The panels and following discussions covered many aspects of EU external policies such as, notably, the European Neighbourhood Policy and also broader policies of democratisation in Europe's neighbourhood and beyond. The opportunity for policy makers and representatives from specific countries to meet and discuss their experience of the EU's democratisation efforts both provided an insight into the policies and gave a first-hand account of how these efforts are being perceived in countries outside the Union.

Although the panel titles ranged across the whole scope of the issue, a number of themes re-emerged in all discussions. The overall message was that democracy promotion in regions neighbouring the EU has indeed frequently resembled a side-effect of EU stabilisation and security policies. Nevertheless, all participants agreed that democratisation as a concept is essential and beneficial for all parties involved. Naturally, there was a noticeable division between how those inside the EU and those at the receiving end of EU democratisation policies understand the methods used. The frustration from unrecognised membership aspirations was noticeable among Eastern European participants, while their colleagues from the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean were more concerned about their cultural and religious heritage, which they perceived as being influenced by the democratisation process.

In comparison to the previous Annual Conference held in May 2005, this year's gathering focused less on specific EU policies and instruments, such as the European Neighbourhood Policy or the Barcelona process, and more on the conceptualisation of broader problems and their solutions. Therefore, attention was also paid to the underlying theoretical concepts of what constitutes liberal democracy, whether different cultural backgrounds are compatible with it, and what requires changing – both in the neighbour states and in the EU's approach towards them. In addition, the idea was explored whether viable and acceptable alternatives to liberal democracy are conceivable.

The first panel shared its theme with the keynote speech that ensued afterwards. The title of the panel, 'Democracy as Highest Policy Imperative?', questioned the prioritisation of democratisation policies over those based on stabilisation and security. An important argument was mentioned in this context: democracy is more than just a surface political reform and regular elections. Rather, democracy is substantial and runs vertically across the whole society. A theme that was first mentioned in this panel ran across the entire conference, especially in relation to Muslim states: it would be a mistake to push a one-size-fits-all definition of democracy. Differentiated democracies

already exist in Europe, respecting different traditions, and this will inevitably become more varied. Tailor-made solutions for each specific system need to be developed. Some participants however, particularly from Arab countries, saw this as a weakness as democracy promotion is said to be lacking unity and using double-standards. The speakers, in general, did not see any genuine push for democracy in the current European external policies.

Lord Dahrendorf's **keynote speech** indirectly addressed this by saying that there were three indispensable aspects of democracy: the possibility of change without violence, a system of checks and balances on the executive power, and input into the political process by all citizens. His speech brought many notable points, including that "(...) it is important to recognise enormous cultural differences between countries as we try to spread parliamentary institutions. Yet throughout, we must remember the basic principles of what we call democracy". And elaborating further on the ways of democracy promotion: "Elections are important and are an element of democratic development precisely because of the necessity to find ways to give citizens an input into the democratic process. Yet to expect elections to produce institutions which can themselves sustain a whole set of democratic agencies was simply a mistake."

The second panel's theme introduced the discussion of specific policies, methods and tools that can be employed in democracy promotion. Conditionality is the most obvious and at least partially successful concept, but the general consensus was that conditionality and external pressure are merely tools in a complex approach that must be built upon bottom-up democratisation. All participants from countries to the East of the EU mentioned that membership perspective would be important motivation for increased effort; however, EU representatives were sceptical whether this was possible. Nevertheless, the general consensus was that membership perspective proved to be the most successful democratisation motivation with current new EU members and a similarly effective reward needs to be found for countries without membership perspective. The underlying argument was that democracy requires the active will and effort of individual countries and cannot be imported from outside.

The last panel of day one of the conference concentrated on Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. Under the sub-title „Beyond Past Achievements“, the representatives of institutions from this region talked about the future steps that would tie their countries closer to the EU. The European Commission's representative listed the main EU instruments in this region as the partnership and cooperation agreement, the growing involvement of the EU in elections, assistance to civil society in the area and ENP. The rest of the panel was spent discussing the pros and cons of these instruments. Linking these activities to wider strategies for security, especially providing incentives for

frozen conflict resolution, was deemed necessary. The subsequent discussion covered the importance of the membership perspective, benchmarks of ENP and the role of Russia as a potential partner for democratisation in the region. A large part of the session focused on issues specific to Belarus, especially the EU's failure to handle civil society support inside an authoritarian system.

The fourth panel dealt with democracy promotion in what can loosely be called Arab countries – that is to say, the varied sub-regions of North Africa, the Middle East and the Gulf. This panel differed from previous panels in that the theme of membership perspective was replaced by a discussion of Islam's compatibility with liberal democracy. A clear argument was that democracy does not need to be secular, despite the EU's legacy of Christian democracy. It was also mentioned both in the speeches and discussion that to ask whether Islam was compatible with democracy was a mistake as to do so equate democratisation with secularisation.

The fifth panel concluded the event with presentations and a short discussion on the future of democratisation. Although this panel was titled Democratisation Now: Agenda for Europe, it focused on learning from the past and ensuring that future benchmarks and subsequent measures reflect progress made. The establishment of a European counterpart to the National Endowment for Democracy was discussed at some length, including the advantages of separating funding for democracy promotion from the EU's current institutions and necessary control mechanisms.

This publication contains abridged summaries of all sessions and following discussions that were delivered at the conference and an unabridged version of the keynote speech by Lord Dahrendorf. The authors and organisers would like to apologise for any omissions or inaccuracies that may have happened due to technical problems with the recording or during the transcription process.

CONFERENCE PROGRAMME

// THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 21

19:00 – 20:30

Glass of wine

Venue: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic

Greetings

Luboš Veselý, Director of the Research Centre, Association for Intl. Affairs

Stefan Gehrold, Director, Konrad Adenauer Foundation Prague

Hana Hubáčková, Director-General of Territorial Section I (Europe),

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

// FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 22

09:00 – 09:45 Welcome Remarks

Edvard Outrata, Vice-President of the Senate
Petr Mareš, President of the Conference, Association for Intl. Affairs
Stefan Gehrold, Director, Konrad Adenauer Foundation Prague

09:45 – 10:45 Panel I – Democratisation as the Highest Policy Imperative?

(What democracy? / Are elections sufficient? / Multiple paradigms?
/ Democracy in defence / Any other way beside democracy?)

Speakers:

Khairi Abaza, Center for Liberty in the Middle East, USA/Egypt
Annegret Bendiek, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Germany
Erhard Busek, Council of the European Union, Austria
Jana Hybášková, Member of European Parliament, Czech Republic
Siarhej Mackevich, Assembly of Belarusian Prodemocratic NGOs, Belarus

Chair:

Petr Mareš, Former Dep. Prime Minister, AMO Advisory Board

10:45 – 11:15 Coffee break

11:15 – 12:15 Discussion on Panel I

12:15 – 12:45 Keynote Speech:

Ralf Lord Dahrendorf

Introduction:

Petr Pithart, 1st Vice-President of the Senate

12:45 – 13:45 Luncheon

- 13:45 – 15:45** **Panel II – Democracy Promotion in Practice:
Methods, Tools and Policies**
(Finding the means / Modus operandi / Allocating resources)
Speakers:
Ayman Abdel Nour, All For Syria Magazine, Syria
Petr Hladík, Policy Unit, Council of the European Union
Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués, Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona, Spain
Anette Jünemann, Helmut Schmidt Universität Hamburg, Germany
Marianne Kneuer, Erfurt University, Germany
Anne-Marie Le Gloannec, CERI, France
Chair:
Stefan Gehrold, Director, Konrad Adenauer Foundation Prague
- 15:45 – 16:15** **Coffee break**
- 16:15 – 18:15** **Panel III – Unfinished Work in Eastern Europe & Caucasus:
Beyond Past Achievements**
(Conditionality required? / Partners / Trade / Vis-à-vis Russia
/ NATO and other actors)
Speakers:
Nataliya Belitser, Pylyp Orlyk Institute for Democracy, Ukraine
Peter Fischer-Bollin, Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Germany
Alena Makouskaja, Homeland Association, Belarus
Hugues Mingarelli, European Commission
Henry Plater-Zyberk, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom
Chair:
Luboš Veselý, Association for International Affairs, Czech Republic
- 20:30 – 22:00** **Dinner**
Venue: Hotel President, Vltava Riverside
Dinner speech:
H.E. Giorgi Baramidze, State Minister on European and Euro-Atlantic
Integration, Georgia
Official toast:
H.E. Jiří Šedivý, Minister of Defence of the Czech Republic

// SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 23

09:00 – 11:00 **Panel IV – Dealing with the „Arab Exception“: In Need of Patience or Insistence?**

(An exception? / European motivation / Peace process repercussions
/ Proving sincerity / „Islamist democracy“?)

Speakers:

Laith Kubba, National Endowment for Democracy, USA

Mohsen Marzouk, Freedom House, Tunisia

Radwan Masmoudi, Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy, USA

Eberhard Rhein, European Policy Centre, Belgium

Richard Youngs, FRIDE, Spain

Chair:

Jan Šnidauf, Association for International Affairs, Czech Republic

11:00 – 11:20 **Coffee break**

11:20 – 13:20 **Panel V – Democratization Now: Agenda for Europe**

(Winds of change? / Cleaning Europe's face / Empowering the Union
/ Involving Member States / Reaching out)

Speakers:

Iris Kempe, Center for Applied Policy Research, Germany

Markus Meckel, Member of German Bundestag, Germany

Marc Schade-Poulsen, Euro-Med Human Rights Network, Denmark

Chair:

Jiří Schneider, Prague Security Studies Institute

13:20 – 14:00 **Closing Remarks**

WELCOME REMARKS

// EDVARD OUTRATA

Vice-President of the Senate

Mr. Outrata welcomed all participants to the conference, stressed the importance of defining democracy and the role of Europe in spreading it, and invited everyone to enjoy their stay in the building that plays an important role in exercising democracy in the Czech Republic.

// PETR MAREŠ

President of the Conference, Association for International Affairs

Speaking on behalf of AMO, Mr. Mareš stressed that the role of democratisation as a tool in EU policies should be discussed both by academics and representatives of European member states.

He went on to emphasise the importance of developing a shared definition of democracy. Without this, misunderstanding or conflict can ensue. For illustration he referred to a meeting between Roosevelt and Stalin in which both talked of democracy, but with starkly contrasting definitions. Nevertheless, there is inherent difficulty in agreeing upon a shared definition; as an example, Europe was unable to anchor a shared set of common values in the European Constitution. Therefore, according to Mr. Mareš, it must be explored, in what way Europe and its neighbours can agree on a definition of democracy.

// STEFAN GEHROLD

Director, Konrad Adenauer Foundation Prague

Mr. Gehrold introduced participants to the work of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. His institution, along with the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, represents the biggest political foundations in Germany. Its key focus is the development of political education, including international cooperation. Since the extension of the EU, the foundation has been engaged in supporting sustained EU integration and an open dialogue between economics and politics.

He then introduced three questions to be developed during the conference:

Should democratisation be the supreme imperative in external policies regarding adjacent countries or can it be regarded as a side-effect of the consequent build-up of intergovernmental relations? What are the alternatives to the Western model of democracy? What methods of external involvement should be chosen to achieve the stabilisation of long-term democratisation? So as to counter the image of democracy as a sign of Western democracy, Mr. Gehrold concluded by saying that attention must be paid to the balance between regional traditions and peculiarities and the establishment of democratic structures.

PANEL I: DEMOCRATISATION AS THE HIGHEST POLICY IMPERATIVE?

// CHAIR: PETR MAREŠ
Association for International Affairs

// KHAIRI ABAZA

Center for Liberty in the Middle East, USA/Egypt

Mr. Abaza began by thanking everyone for bringing up a topic that touches both Europe and the Arab world. He went on to tackle two issues central to the issue of democratisation: the need to widen the narrow definition of democracy currently in use so as to encompass democracies stemming from different cultural backgrounds and the present oversimplification of the choice between extremists and present governments in the Middle East.

According to Mr. Abaza, cultural background is essential to a country's particular form of democracy. Each country should be able to build its own form of democracy on the basic principles of transparency, accountability and the right to peaceful change of government. Mr. Abaza questioned elections as the key to democracy. In contrast, in the Arab world, a free political environment—freedom of speech, religion, assembly and the freedom to create political parties—must be established before elections can take place.

He went on to state that the dilemma between extremists and existing regimes in the Middle East—as it is described by some—is an oversimplification resulting from a lack of historical understanding of the region. He rejected the frequent cultural explanations for the lack of democracy in the region. On closer inspection, those believing in liberal democracy in the Middle East have been weak historically. The main political movements in the Arab world in the second half of the 20th century were always members of international solidarity networks (Soviet or Islamic). In contrast, western democrats have turned their back on liberal democrats in the region over the past fifty years. Furthermore, dictators are aware that democrats offer an alternative to their regimes in the view of the West, and therefore maintain their weak position. They often do so by highlighting the threat of Islamists among the international community, which they say justifies strong authoritarian rule, thus providing grounds for avoiding the implementation of political reform.

Democratic reforms are the only method to improve the situation in the Arab world and benchmarks are essential to give hope. Mr. Abaza concluded by stressing that radicalism and emigration would be the consequences of the Middle East's lack of reform and poor management. Unless Europe commits itself seriously to assisting democracy among its Arab neighbours, it will bear these consequences.

// ANNEGRET BENDIEK

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Germany

Ms. Bendiek presented an analysis of democracy promotion within European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Stabilisation and Association Process, including membership perspective. Her main conclusion was that the European approach towards the 16 ENP partners is about security rather than democracy promotion. Although membership perspective represented a vital incentive for countries to implement important democratic reforms, it has been systematically excluded from ENP.

The EU security strategy paper was signed in December 2003 in reaction to American security policy. National security policies contain a great deal of democracy promotion, which, from the US perspective, means regime change as a precondition for security. In the EU strategy paper, democracy promotion is mentioned twice, but never as an objective. Rather, democracy is used to describe the political structure on which the EU is based.

In contrast to democratisation, the first objective of the EU security strategy paper is to develop a zone of 'friendly neighbours'. The second objective is to prevent new dividing lines between the expanding EU and its new neighbours over the next years. Relations in the ENP framework will be based on mutual commitment to common values (the rule of law, good governance, and respect for human rights), the promotion of good relations and the principles of market economy. Their rationale is the export of internal EU policies while avoiding the import of insecurity from the European neighbourhood.

She concluded by stressing that ENP can be seen as a top-down approach that motivates the EU to extend the European security zone, to support the development of multilateral order and develop countermeasures to both old and new threats. In the process of security regime building, the European Union is entering a national period of revision, including a revision of the inclusive model and multiculturalism.

// ERHARD BUSEK

Council of the European Union

Mr. Busek described his experiences with democracy development in South-East Europe in his role of Stability Pact Special Coordinator and introduced a number of issues essential to democratic development.

Firstly, he questioned a one-size-fits-all definition of democracy due to the differentiated nature of democracies already existing in Europe. He stressed the need for

a differentiated concept of democracy which respects different traditions. In South-East Europe, according to him, this is an essential part of development.

The European membership can be seen as a method of guaranteeing democracy. This is what the EU primarily meant for Greece, Spain and Portugal at the time of their accession. A country's history can have a strong influence on the democratic situations that develop within its borders. One must also recognise that democracy is more than simply a party system and parliamentary elections but rather represents complete democratic development, including processes such as democratisation of the armed forces. This was particularly difficult in South-East Europe where the former Yugoslav People's Army does not yet fully adhere to democratic rules.

He went on to state the need to support a sustainable civil society rather than a party system since civil society represents one of the preconditions of democracy. In addition, Europe must be aware of its limitations regarding the influence on local development. Education is also essential for the development of a democratic regime. The question of democracy must be linked with education through dialogue with teaching professionals; Mr. Busek expressed his disappointment in the EU's capacity in this area.

He further expressed his frustration over the lack of democracy in the global economy, even on the European level. The European parliament is limited in its rights and consequently, national governments do not always follow a desirable good democratic practice on the EU level. He concluded by agreeing with previous speakers that ENP is little more than a method for stabilisation.

// JANA HYBÁŠKOVÁ

Member of European Parliament, Czech Republic

Ms. Hybášková elaborated on the previous discussion concerning the variations of democracy and stressed that, for a stable future, certain rights and freedoms must be agreed as universal and shared throughout all forms of democracy. She agreed with previous speakers that ENP and its action plans represent an EU strategy for achieving stability in the European neighbourhood, yet she stressed that democracy is a prerequisite of reaching stability.

Ms. Hybášková then emphasised the need for prioritisation, action and benchmarks. She visualised ENP action plans as a positive first step in setting up partnerships with those countries for whom EU membership is not yet a possibility. She then outlined five priorities for the democratisation of the European neighbourhood. Firstly, the process must be seen as a struggle for public space where democratic competition is used rather than force, particularly employing the media. Secondly,

to promote democracy, multi-party system must be legislated as one cannot encourage free and fair elections without it. While laws of many Arab countries stipulate for a multi-party system, a number of parties in these countries are not permitted to register. Thirdly, the rule of law is vital for the development of democracy. The view frequently prevailing in the Middle East that the rule of law represents the rule of a leader must be countered. Fourthly it is the human rights as the final result of fulfilling a number of other conditions. Lastly, without dismantling the tight security systems that are in force in many Middle Eastern countries and function as the main tools of oppression, it will not be possible to reach democratisation, human rights and free and fair elections.

// SIARHEJ MACKEVICH

Assembly of Belarusian Pro-democratic NGOs, Belarus

Mr. Mackevich provided participants with an insider's view of a European dictatorship. Firstly, he described the present state of democracy in Belarus: according to him, most Belarusians are satisfied in their needs for democracy. All symbols of democracy exist and most citizens do not understand civic protests such as those that took place in spring 2006. Belarusian state institutions aim to keep democratic participation at a low level through changes to legislation, limitations of the power of the citizens, state propaganda and the education system. The word, 'democracy' is considered to be very important and is therefore employed regularly in propaganda rhetoric, particularly stating that Belarus is witnessing a flourishing of democracy. Belarusian people are not able to learn about the true substance of the concept as the state draws a picture of democracy that reflects the life of the population. Although the regime declares it has its own path to democracy, Mr. Mackevich said, this path is the same as the Soviet path. To accept this model, the state offers social and economic incentives.

Mr. Mackevich then went on to underline the need for strength in the face of such a totalitarian state. The fight against the Belarusian regime concerns basic values and cannot therefore be compromised. Attempting to use political methods such as negotiation have not been effective as witnessed in the last ten years, and there has been no real steps towards democracy in Belarus. The Belarusian regime has made its choice concerning democracy; therefore, a tactical retreat would result in the loss of gains achieved thus far. He concluded by underlining the importance of the European Union in the development of democracy in Belarus and its surrounding countries. He also noted that although the EU took a clear position on human rights violations in Belarus, a similar position has not developed regarding Central Asian countries.

// DISCUSSION

Speakers and participants focused their questions on 3 areas: the inability of the EU to transfer its experiences in South-East and Eastern Europe to the Middle East; elections as the key to democracy; and whether liberal democracies are well-positioned in the struggle for democratisation on the global stage.

Ms. Hybášková praised Mr. Busek's speech for drawing attention to the EU's successful efforts in promoting democratic processes in South-East Europe and the Union's inability to transmit this know-how to the relations with Middle Eastern countries. She pointed out, that although a strategy for each country should be tailor-made, Europe must also be able to use its past experiences and transmit the lessons learned. Mr. Zouhair Jibraili, Deputy Ambassador of Morocco, objected to Ms. Hybášková's generalisations about the Arab world, particularly considering exceptions such as Morocco, which has had a multi-party system since 1958.

Mr. Markus Meckel, Member of German Parliament, asked participants to question the prioritisation of elections as the symbol of democracy and to rather push for a differentiated agenda. Mr. Abaza responded by stating that elections are not the key to reform, but rather reforms are key to elections. Mr. Mackevich provided the example of Belarus, in which he claimed the conditions for free and fair elections must first be guaranteed.

Mr. Plater-Zyberk from the UK Defence Academy asked the speakers whether they considered a liberal democracy being in a strong position to fight for democratisation in the world. He argued that the EU is unable to handle present threats; EU counter-terrorism has a role to play but is at present not coherent in its policy. Therefore, in the future, Europe may not maintain such a community-based policy but rather stronger and coherent intergovernmental cooperation. Ms. Hybášková responded by stressing that liberal democracies are able to counter terrorism, citing the example of Northern Ireland. She stated that the EU structure is problematic as it separates external relations and justice affairs into two areas. A new strategy must be developed to bring them together.

KEYNOTE SPEECH

// PETR PITHART

1st Vice-President of the Senate

Mr. Pithart introduced the keynote speech by expressing his respect for Lord Dahrendorf's reflections on the 1989 revolution in Europe. He stated that Dahrendorf's optimistic prediction of the development in Central and Eastern Europe, which proved to be true, was due to his profound understanding of post-war development in Western Europe.

Mr. Pithart went on to stress the correctness of Lord Dahrendorf's foresight that, particularly, after the revolution the road to prosperity for countries of Central and Eastern Europe would be longer than expected. Also his social predictions are still valid: the decisive issue is the extent of openness of society and not a conflict between capitalism and communism. He concluded by saying that Lord Dahrendorf, perceives the issues of the current world in the general context as well as in connection to the development of ideas and institutions. This remains to be a privilege of very few people in the time of globalisation. We are glad one of those is here with us today'.

// RALPH LORD DAHRENDORF

It is moving to be back in Prague, where I was for the first time in the famous spring of 1968, a spring full of hope and the subsequent realisation that such hope was premature. I remember warmly that exciting period when we first met in 1989/1990, Václav Havel's move to the castle, and the almost childish excitement that followed. These memories alone are indicative of one of my basic convictions which I would like to make explicit today.

I believe it is right to try to spread democracy in the world, even today under the shadow of what happened in Iraq. I supported the invasion of Iraq in the British Parliament in light of the memories of Eastern Europe. I talked about what might have happened if an international community had intervened in German affairs in 1938. The Westphalian principle of non-interference is not a principle to which I, as a liberal democrat, can subscribe. I believe in democracy and liberty as values which are applicable everywhere and, therefore, I feel that we have a responsibility to go beyond the Westphalian principle. I was interested in the reaction of China to the recent and ongoing coup in Thailand. The Chinese reaction was, 'these are Thailand's internal affairs'. That is a characteristic attitude and the opposite of my own. This informs the five quick points I wish to make here.

My first point is that the Copenhagen criteria cannot be overrated in their importance and are one indication of how one may spread democracy. The criteria are a minute-long extract from a meeting's proceedings. They do not over-formulate what we want to achieve but make it quite clear that, in order to be a part of Europe, a country has to subscribe to the principles of democracy, the rules governing a market economy and the rule of law. One can consider the Copenhagen criteria of 1993 an immense success regarding the recent process of EU enlargement. The accession is in line with the Copenhagen criteria and is, if we consider it part of foreign policy, a remarkable story of spreading the

rules and conditions of democracy far and wide. In truth, I believe the enlargement of the European community to be one of the greatest achievements of the European Union.

My second point has been mentioned by several speakers this morning, in particular by Ms. Hybášková: how we can define democracy and whether there are cultural differences which should affect the way we consider democracy. I have had the good fortune to be a member of parliament for both the UK and Germany. Yet the parliaments of these two countries could hardly be more different within similar institutional arrangements. There are clearly enormous differences between different countries and I think it is important to recognise these differences as we try and spread parliamentary institutions. Yet throughout we must remember the basic principles of what we call democracy. There are three principles that are indispensable when talking about democracy in different countries:

- Karl Popper's thesis of change without violence. Change without violence is an immensely valuable principle which can be implemented in a variety of ways. For example in the 22nd amendment to the American constitution that says the president cannot be in power for more than two successive periods.
- A system of checks and balances on the executive power. That is to say, to make sure that whoever has power is exposed to effective institutional checks and cannot rule on whim. Such checks and balances are provided by a whole range of institutions, from constitutional courts to the media, but above all by parliamentary control and debate.
- An input to the political process by every citizen. Incidentally, this is where international and super-national democracy begins to come into difficulties yet it is nevertheless central to democratic institutions.

My third point focuses on foreign policy. I think that the easiest way to talk about foreign policy and democracy is to ask what went wrong in Iraq. From the beginning, I saw the process in Iraq as the removal of an ugly dictator and the opening up of principles which I have already enunciated. One thing that went wrong was that Condoleezza Rice firmly believed that one might find a situation similar to that in post-WW2 Germany or Japan. While there were other interests and views in the American government, the notion that one can militarily defeat a country and then bring democracy to it whilst meeting with widespread popular support, played a part among those who gave any thought at all to post-war Iraq. This was the wrong analogy for a number of reasons:

- After five years of war, Germany was totally defeated and every citizen knew it.
- In Germany, one could make use of those who were still alive from an earlier experiment in democracy. Many of the early institutions included many people who had

been politicians in the pre-war period, those who had been practicing democrats not so long ago. The same was clearly not true in Iraq.

- The American armed forces were extremely incompetent when it came to matters beyond military objectives. This was different in 1945 as people had given a lot of thought as to what should happen after the war and there were a number of German who had been expelled and who could help the American forces set up institutions with some local foundation.

Add to that the belief that elections are enough to establish democratic institutions and you have a recipe for disaster. Elections are important and are an element of democratic development precisely because of the necessity to find ways to give citizens an input into the democratic process. Yet to expect elections to produce institutions which can themselves sustain a whole set of democratic agencies was simply a mistake. So what we see is the dreadful story we read about every day and one is bound to conclude that democracy has not succeeded in Iraq and its success is debatable in Afghanistan. That is to say, the methods chosen have not satisfied the objective.

In Europe, my greatest worry was that people in their own minds linked democracy and prosperity too closely and many believed that all you needed was democratic institutions to be rich. The discovery that democracy does not make you rich and indeed initially seems to make you poorer than you were before did not help the legitimization of democratic institutions. Therefore, we can say that there was a total lack of sophistication in recent cases of trying to spread democracy.

What then is a better method? Civil society is a wonderful concept and I believe I made my own contributions in 89/90 when I first came to Prague and chaired a small foundation called the Central and Eastern European Publishing Project which supported initially illegal samizdat and then the creation of journals. This kind of civil society building is a massive but highly important job, one which can best be done by non-governmental organisations. I have also given some thought to the question of whether we need a different kind of invasion force if we want to introduce democracy. This doesn't only mean better educated soldiers but perhaps a technical core which is particularly sensitive to the requirements that may be encountered when moving into countries which may move towards democracy. I am not a great friend of the division of labour theory of international policy between the US and Europe (i.e. let the US do the bombing and we do the rebuilding) but I do find something peculiarly European in the notion of organised groups which, with public money, are capable of providing both rebuilding capacity and protection capacity.

This leads me to my fifth and final point: the rule of law. I hope this does not disappoint too many of you as I simply do not believe that democracy and the rule of law are the same. There are countries which were quite clearly democratic but which had consistent difficulties regarding the rule of law (incidentally, this is one of the USA's oldest problems). The law in America is a very special and interesting issue. It has been used as much as a replacement for the gun as it has been as an expression of a common belief in certain rules that must be upheld. At the other end of the spectrum, Prussia had very strong elements of the rule of law without being democratic. I use these examples in order to make it clear that I do not believe there is an automatic link between the effective rule of law and an effective democracy. Yet there is a need for an independent judiciary which is not corrupt and which guards a minimum set of rules; a judiciary which is part of the core of the constitutions of liberty. Therefore, the rule of law as well as democracy must be propagated and defended when attacked.

PANEL II: DEMOCRACY PROMOTION IN PRACTICE

**// METHODS, TOOLS
AND POLICIES**

// CHAIR: STEFAN GEHROLD

Director, Konrad Adenauer Foundation Prague

// **AYMAN ABDEL NOUR**

All for Syria Magazine, Syria

Mr. Abdel Nour began by pointing out the different definitions of democratisation as used by the West (notably the EU and US) and by non-democratic regimes: the West understands democracy promotion as a deep structural reform whilst such regimes see it as a simple cosmetic change. He pointed out that the EU approach is lacking in a number of fields:

- The EU is unresolved over which form of democracy it wants to implement, does not send a clear message to the respective regimes concerning its positions and does not place enough pressure.
- There must be cooperation between the EU and US in respect of the Middle East. Previous efforts by the US to exert pressure in 2005 met with positive results yet were not supported by the EU.
- The EU must maintain support for democrats in the face of pressure from non-democratic regime.
- EU funding mechanisms are of limited efficiency due to complicated application processes and the requirement that organisations be licensed through the government. As a result, virtually all human rights organisations as well as relevant electronic websites and associations dealing with secularism, children's rights and civil society are denied the funds.
- The EU needs to recognise the detrimental effects of its inability to stand up to its own proclamations of support for democratic movements in the Middle East. In the meantime, the regimes have increased the number of arrests and developed tools to ostensibly display the democratic features of their rule.

Mr. Abdel Nour then went on to outline three recommendations: the EU should not only work with governments, it must speak seriously about democracy and must consult with experts from the regions involved.

// **PETR HLADÍK**

Policy Unit, Council of the European Union

Mr. Hladík first described the concrete activities of the European Union aiming to enhance the principles of democracy as outlined by previous speakers. The most prominent EU instrument for democracy promotion is the membership perspective, a strategy still present in the Stabilisation and Association Process in the Balkans, and

the Barcelona process. Mr. Hladik defended the latter as an important method for communication and interaction. He then went on to state that EU strategy regarding democracy development still has potential for improvement but steps are being taken: European Neighbourhood Policy as a tailor-made approach for the needs of each country; and the leadership role EU plays within the UN when employing more than 30 rule-of-law missions around the world.

Nevertheless, he stressed that the quality of international society is dependent on the quality of its governments. That is to say, EU democracy promotion still depends on the will of its member states. EU engagement requires the concrete will of each and every state to actively contribute. He concluded by highlighting the importance of media and education in democracy development strategies and suggested that the EU should provide radio facilities and invest in infrastructure.

// ELISABETH JOHANSSON-NOGUÉS

Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona, Spain

Ms. Nogués, in a follow-up to the previous speakers, stated that evidence shows that EU democracy promotion is a spin-off effect rather than an objective. To demonstrate this, she presented an analysis of EU rhetoric.

Recently, values such as democracy and human rights have been given some urgency on the EU foreign policy agenda. Rather than being setting objectives, this normative power rhetoric is a method for the Union to differentiate itself from other international players, such as the US. Yet the EU as a normative power has constrained options of democracy promotion. Furthermore, this rhetoric restrains the EU in that it shifts its focus towards the most non-democratic countries and demands the investment of time and money into changing these regimes. Ms. Nogués argued that if the EU wishes to style itself as a normative power, it should rather concentrate on the countries already moving along the path to democracy (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia). Thus, reducing the contradictions of which the EU is often accused and presenting these countries as showcases for non-democratic regimes.

She then indicated a remedy by means of three steps. Firstly, the EU must discuss the kind of reforms needed in close cooperation with local elites of the target countries. Secondly, coordination between international actors and democracy promotion efforts of EU member states is essential so as to avoid incoherent ad hoc democratisation. Lastly, the EU must combine long and short-term strategies, since experience reveals that short-term efforts have not been sufficient.

// ANNETTE JÜNEMANN

Helmut-Schmidt-Universität Hamburg, Germany

Ms. Jünemann presented the results of a research project on the selection and implementation of strategies to develop democracies in third countries. She began by stressing that EU democracy promotion does not follow a one-size-fits-all approach as strategies vary from region to region. Stressing the importance of an understanding of why there is such variation in strategy, she went on to highlight four factors contributing to it:

- The multi-level decision making system in the EU
- The nature of relations between Europe and the third country. The more bilateral relations exist between a third state and member states, the less space there is for the European Community to act.
- The structure of resonance within the country. EU policies aim at consolidating democracies rather than creating them. Membership perspective was previously the most successful democracy promotion tool available. Yet for those countries without such a perspective, the EU will often opt to support stability rather than democracy.
- The international context. Paradigmatic shifts in the international environment have an effect on the rating of democracy promotion within the EU foreign policy agenda. Since 9/11, hard security strategies have been prioritised and the soft security strategies preferred until that time have been losing ground.

Ms. Jünemann concluded with the observation that criticism of the European Union for its incoherence in democracy promotion is deserved, but, on the other hand, it is difficult to propose better strategies.

// MARIANNE KNEUER

Erfurt University, Germany

Ms. Kneuer began by stating that conditionality is a basic method that has been used in democratisation as well as enlargement policies. The conditionality as applied by the EU is a complex incentive-based pressure system that motivates the democratisation process during the pre-accession phase.

She went on to stress that the EU's understanding of conditionality differs from other concepts in the following ways:

- It includes special incentives and instruments for democracy. The incentive of future membership provides the Union with a strong position of leverage.

- The incremental and flexible character of EU conditionality, which is due to the European concept being altered and developed in reaction to challenges. The most recent challenge was the Western Balkan states, where conditions were further developed and instruments adjusted to the changing environment. The Copenhagen criteria were crucial as they made focused targeting of problems possible by means of concrete recommendations.
- EU conditionality has stronger leverage than other instances. This leverage gives the EU a potential to influence the whole reform and democratisation process in a country in a direct and deliberate way.

She then went on to evaluate the successes and limits of conditionality. Following the Southern and Eastern expansion, conditionality can be considered a successful method since these countries are reformed, democratic and have sustainable development. Yet there are a number of limitations, which she demonstrated through the example of Slovakia. The Mečiar government in Slovakia at that time refused to accept conditions, recommendations or pressure from the EU. In general, the leverage of EU policies becomes drastically reduced as soon as membership perspective is lacking (the |European Neighbourhood Policy being one instance).

// ANNE-MARIE LE GLOANNEC

CERI, France

For the start, Ms. Le Gloannec explained that the EU is only serious about democracy within and on its own borders. Through its enlargement, the Union has been very successful in supporting democracy but very timid at the same time in pushing for democracy worldwide.

She went on to the importance of recognizing the roots of democracy promotion.

- Today's interaction between the EU and totalitarian regimes is strongly based on CSCE/OSCE that developed in 1970. According to Ms. Le Gloannec, this occasion represented the defining moment of European foreign policy.
- Democracy promotion also grew from policies towards the African, Caribbean and Pacific regions (ACP countries). In the beginning of the 1990s, the EU was designing its common foreign and security policy. The declared support for democracy concealed in reality a lack of coherence and grand vision concerning the rest of the world.

She went on to stress that EU democracy promotion and conditionality are limited, both regarding Europe and the rest of the world. The Union has not been engaged in

democracy promotion but rather remained in democracy entrenchment. As a result, its potential to succeed has been limited in territories on the European margins where democracy promotion is essential. EU interactions with countries in the rest of the world have had a similar character.

In conclusion, she stressed that if the EU wishes to continue in democracy promotion, it must combine its present bottom-up policies with top-down policies, domestic dynamics and outside intervention.

// DISCUSSION

The discussion focused on the importance of EU membership perspective as an incentive for democratisation, the significance of a transatlantic approach to democracy promotion and the long-term strategies of the EU.

Mr. Gehrold, Konrad Adenauer Foundation, stated that conditionality worked effectively when there was membership perspective and asked the speakers what incentives remain. In his opinion, the only possibility is to cooperate with those countries in which democracy exists and works to create new plans for the future. Ms. Kempe from the Centre for Applied Policy Research, Munich, echoed previous speakers in saying that democracy promotion without membership perspective incentive is limited in its success. In Ukraine and Georgia, where there is little chance of accession, dangerous political situations are developing. She warned against ruling out the possibility of membership for European neighbours. One participant suggested activities such as the US Millennium Challenge Account to support development and reform. Ms. Nogués emphasised the need to try again to find a positive alternative to EU accession.

A number of participants also stressed the importance of a transatlantic approach to democracy promotion and stated the need for further discussion on how the US and Europe could come together to tackle particular issues in some regions.

Elsa Tulmets of the European University Institute disagreed with Ms. Jünemann's speech suggesting that the EU is beginning to give up its soft, long-term strategy of democracy promotion. In contrast, Ms. Tulmets stressed that through ENP, the EU is trying to develop a discourse different from the hard-line policy wording used by the USA.

**PANEL III:
UNFINISHED WORK
IN EASTERN
EUROPE
AND CAUCASUS**

**// BEYOND
PAST ACHIEVEMENTS**

// CHAIR: LUBOŠ VESELÝ

Association for International Affairs, Czech Republic

The chair began by stressing that Eastern Europe and the Caucasus are still a big challenge for the EU. Although much has been spoken about support for civil society and democracy in this region, little good news has been heard from Belarus or Transnistria. The EU is not willing to give a positive answer to the European aspirations of those countries. He expressed his uncertainty over whether ENP could be a solution and stated that US support for civil society has so far been more effective than European. Although the EU has been the biggest donor in Belarus over past years, only a small amount went to civil society.

// NATALIYA BELITSER

Pylyp Orlyk Institute for Democracy, Ukraine

Ms. Belitser concentrated on the topic of frozen conflicts: their definition, what they reflect and the role of the European Union in their settlement.

She began by explaining the use of the term 'frozen conflict' in cases where, following ceasefire agreements, no progress has been made in politics or reintegration, for example Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Transnistria. These conflicts remain frozen as Russia is the main stakeholder in the area and is not interested in the reintegration of former republics. Furthermore, the EU has little interest in the region as it still considers them Russian territory. In response, the named separatist regions took on aspects of de facto states and strengthened their independence from their internationally recognised states of origin. Russian withdrawal from these regions will be essential to ending frozen conflict. She described as important the recent strict formulation by the Georgian parliament demanding the end of Russian presence in the country and an alteration of the negotiating format.

Ms. Belitser stressed the importance of EU intervention in frozen conflicts as these countries increasingly lie on the border of the Union. The EU has good leverage for negotiations with Russia and eventual conflict settlement. Such an effort would be greatly appreciated by national governments in contrast to the military effort of NATO, and would face less resistance within separatist enclaves as this is only an objection to military intervention. The main promoters of a deeper involvement of the EU in settling frozen conflicts should be the Visegrad Group plus the Baltic countries since it is in their best interest to reach stability and sustainable development in the region. She concluded by suggesting that the Transnistria frozen conflict be selected as a testing ground for European security policy as it is not complicated by ethnic conflicts.

// PETER FISCHER-BOLLIN

Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Germany

Mr. Fischer-Bollin emphasised that all activities in support of democracy are linked to strategies in other fields (security, European integration). For this reason, concepts must be flexible so as to adapt to changing conditions and requirements.

He went on to highlight five areas of importance when considering and implementing democracy promotion:

- Conditionality is essential for guaranteeing the promotion of democracy
- Democratisation in Eastern Europe should not only concern governments but also political parties and civil society. Teaching institutes and local administrations are also essential to democracy promotion in terms of educating and involving the population in decision making; the whole process of democracy is strengthened.
- Russia is an important actor in Eastern Europe and Caucasus that must not be ignored. Due to its strong position in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus and its close ties with its neighbours (Belarus, Ukraine), Russia must be considered a partner for the development of the region. Therefore, EU democracy promotion policy faces the challenge of entering a constructive dialogue with the Russian government and Russian civil society.
- NATO could and should play a more active and political role in the region in the form of political development and democracy. This would remove all fears that a country may become the target of military aggression. Furthermore, NATO could be a forum to debate US and EU strategies of democracy promotion.
- All democratisation strategies must take into account the political, cultural and social circumstances. Democratisation itself must be part of European, national and regional policies and must therefore be exercised by the European Council, national governments and NGOs.

// ALENA MAKOUSKAJA

Homeland Association, Belarus

Ms. Makouskaja began by describing the activities of her organisation. Since 1990, the Homeland Association has tried to keep track of the community of three million Belarusians living worldwide and to identify their potential for the benefit of the country.

She then explained what can be done to assist members of the third sector in Belarus, i.e. the non-governmental and non-profit organisations. President Lukashenka

has become a hostage of his own policies that force him to continue his destruction of and control over all levels of society. Despite the call from some European politicians to enter into a dialogue with Mr. Lukashenka, civil society organisations insist that such a move would only be possible if all political prisoners were freed. Ms. Makouskaja highlighted the failure of the EU to handle the Belarusian dictatorship and to cooperate effectively with civil society structures. Nevertheless, EU policy has become more tailor-made and flexible since the enlargement. She then outlined a number of ways in which the EU can affect the situation in Belarus:

- The continuation of special reports on Belarus
- Support to civil society and mass media. The EU should understand the limitations and restrictions faced by independent media and provide complex support, consult media professionals and consider long-term projects.
- An offer of cheap visas for Belarus so as not to isolate the country. That is particularly important in light of the planned increase in visa prices for the neighbouring countries of the newly enlarged Schengen system.
- Increased and more flexible youth exchanges.
- The protection of people under repression. Although there are now a number of projects to help persecuted students enter European universities, there is still little protection for those who are made unemployed by the government.
- Support for and close cooperation with NGOs, particularly through the establishment of a democracy fund. In Belarus, NGOs often work in poor conditions, are heavily repressed and must go through the process of registration every two years, often resulting in the withdrawal of registration.
- Support for Belarusian culture as the only legal instrument capable of interacting with the Belarusian people, particularly in rural areas.

// HUGUES MINGARELLI

European Commission

Mr. Mingarelli outlined the main EU instruments for the promotion of democracy in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus: Partnership and Cooperation Agreements; growing EU involvement in elections in the area; various assistance programmes to support civil society, and the European Neighbourhood Policy. All these instruments are essential for trade and investment between the EU and third countries. The intensity of economic cooperation is made dependent on the willingness of a country to follow its commitments to democratic reform and the rule of law.

He went on to stress that any incentives could be further enhanced, and presented a number of incentives as suggested by a range of actors:

- More freedom regarding the movement of people. In response, the EC is negotiating an agreement with Ukraine on the facilitation of visas.
- The opening of the EU internal market. Mr. Mingarelli emphasised that this is an effective lever regarding the economic struggle of many third countries but it demands financial commitment from member states. The EU has worked extensively in this area, for example establishing asymmetric trade preferences with Moldova.
- The resolution of frozen conflicts that is made particularly difficult because of member states' reluctance to threaten their relations with Russia. A new comprehensive agreement is being developed with Russia to replace the current Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, which will cover all aspects of relations with Russia (economic, environmental as well as human rights cooperation).

Mr. Mingarelli also insisted that the EU has not failed in its democracy promotion activities in Belarus. It was rather a failure of the international community as since 1994, and the EU strategy has been closely coordinated with US policy. The EU has engaged in a large assistance programme for Belarusian civil society, funding of non-registered NGOs, funding of media broadcasts from neighbouring countries, the European Humanities University and the adoption of targeted restrictive measures (visa bans, asset freezes). Furthermore, the EU is presently designing an ENP 'shadow' action plan to demonstrate to the Belarusian population the benefits of a full relationship with the EU.

// HENRY PLATER-ZYBERK

Defence Academy of the United Kingdom

Mr. Plater-Zyberk focused on questions linked to post-Putin Russia and how future Russian leadership could change that country's foreign policy towards Europe. As President Putin is very popular, Russia will look for someone similar to replace him.

He stressed that several possible scenarios must be considered in respect of the future of Russian politics. The Russian constitution allows Putin to run for president more than twice, but not consecutively. Therefore, Mr. Plater-Zyberk suggested, the possibility should he acknowledged that Mr. Putin may change the constitution for his own benefit to enable for himself to run for the office again.

He then suggested that Russia, like any country rich in oil or gas, is going to use its resources as a foreign policy tool. Russia does not have to launch missiles to achieve

its goals, but simply turn off oil and gas supplies for some time. He stressed the need for realism, citing as unrealistic the demands that President Putin should help Ukraine with subsidised gas or that Russia should modernise its oil industry.

Future EU/Russia relations will be dominated first and foremost by energy, but also by security and trade. While little can be done in the energy sector apart from reducing consumption, trade and financial issues will be dominated by market forces unless Europe resorts to some extent of protectionism.

// DISCUSSION

The discussion specifically focused on comments made by Mr. Mingarelli from the European Commission, particularly concerning EU membership perspective, ENP, its benchmarking options, EU-Russia relations and EU funding for civil society and democracy in Belarus.

Both Ana Rudico of the Moldovan Institute for Public Policy and Nataliya Belitser, Pylyp Orlyk Institute for Democracy, stressed the need to offer membership perspective to East European neighbours, particularly Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. Ms. Belitser emphasised that the offer of membership does not have any alternative and must be made to countries as an incentive to implement reforms. She went on to express her anger that countries that are strongly interested in EU membership are grouped in one general European neighbourhood policy framework alongside African and Middle Eastern states that lack such interest. Mr. Mingarelli replied stating that no EU leader has ever said the door of the EU is closed to new members. Any country on the continent can apply for membership and is judged on its own merits. It is true, though, that for a number of reasons, leaders of large member states do not consider membership perspective high on the agenda.

A number of participants questioned various elements of ENP. Mr. Mingarelli replied that the policy can contribute to the stabilisation of particular regions, e.g. South Ossetia or Transnistria. The EU will step up involvement in frozen conflicts, provided there is a political will among member states. In the economic field, there are means to promote gradual integration of these countries into the EU market, yet the speed will depend on the political and economic price EU members are willing to pay. ENP provides some instruments to promote the gradual integration of economies and consequently the stabilisation of the political situation in those countries.

Ana Rudico proposed that the EU should become more actively involved in Eastern Europe and cease being merely an observer, such as in Transnistria. Mr. Mingarelli continued saying that although Russia does not impose the EU agenda, the Union lacks sufficient strength when raising issues with the country. Russia prefers bilateral relations with large member states so as to avoid common EU positions on sensitive issues.

Marc Schade-Poulsen from the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network in Denmark questioned the ENP progress and emphasised the need for measurements and benchmarks concerning progress towards European values. Mr. Mingarelli disagreed whilst refuting the need for sophisticated benchmarks. Within each ENP action plan, he argued, an implementation tool is employed that enables progress checks every three months concerning commitments made.

Mr. Pawel Kazanecki questioned a number of claims made by Mr. Mingarelli concerning EU activities in Belarus. According to Mr. Kazanecki, funds to Belarusian non-registered organisations are primarily from the US while the EU does not have strong mechanisms for building long term financial aid for democracy. He went on to criticise EU funding of foreign media, particularly the selection of a Russian TV company to implement the project. He also stressed that the Union needs to establish new and more flexible mechanisms for individual countries, including the development of EU funds for democracy. Mr. Mingarelli responded by stating that the EU does fund unregistered NGOs in Belarus through the EIDHR and the decentralised cooperation instrument. However, the EU refuses to directly fund political parties. He also defended the selection of the Russian TV station since the decision was made in cooperation with Belarusian leaders.

PANEL IV: DEALING WITH THE „ARAB EXCEPTION“

**// NEED FOR PATIENCE
OR INSISTENCE?**

// CHAIR: JAN ŠNAIDAUF
Association for International Affairs

// LAITH KUBBA

National Endowment for Democracy, USA

Mr. Kubba shared his view that the impacts on Europe of the political situation in the Middle East imply that democratisation in the region is now an EU priority. This is of growing importance due to security concerns, economic globalisation and cultural exchange. Despite the negative connotations that follow the term democratisation in the Middle East, Mr. Kubba believes that democracy can and should be promoted “below the radars of politics”. Social democratisation does not need to be politicised.

There are cultural differences between Arab countries and the West, embodied in the fast and imperfect transition from tribal society to modern states in case of the former, in contrast to the gradual cultivation of democracies via incremental changes in case of the latter. Nevertheless, democratic principles are compatible with the many cultures existing in the sub-regions of Northern Africa, the Gulf and the Middle East. A number of pro-democratic changes already happened from within constitutional monarchies without disrupting their foundations.

Two main factors facilitate democracy promotion in this region: information and communication technology ending government control over media and information; and the new equilibrium of the East-West polarity since the end of the Cold War. At the same time there are sources of resistance, such as those in power who risk destruction of their countries merely because of personal power (Saddam Hussein being an example). A fear of the unknown is also characteristic of societies in these countries, alongside invented political accusation against democracy.

Mr. Kubba identified several approaches to democracy promotion. While he dismissed the use of external pressure to enforce democracy as simplistic and ineffective, he saw it as an instrument in a holistic approach. In his view, the next possibility is top-down democratisation by a country’s authoritarian ruler, but he preferred the idea of a subtle cultivation of democracy from within. Even authoritarian governments allow democratising activities in areas that are not directly threatening their power and these country-specific aspects should be identified and utilised. Importantly, engaging so-called Islamists in the political process is a prerequisite for success, since democracy cannot be built by suppressing certain core cultural values of society. Current development in Turkey shows that even in a secular country sensitivity is required in regard to religious issues. According to Mr. Kubba, supporting reformers within authoritarian regimes is a very powerful instrument and, therefore, critics from within countries such as Syria, Libya, Egypt and Yemen need international support. A lot more can be achieved by democratising authoritarian regimes at the local level than at higher, central power structures.

// RICHARD YOUNGS

FRIDE, Spain

Mr. Youngs focused on three main questions: whether the EU was serious in respect of democratisation in the Middle East, whether there was a coherent and distinctly European approach to Middle-Eastern democracy and, lastly, the strengths and weaknesses of such a strategy.

According to Mr. Youngs, European policy-makers have been more unified and pro-active since 9/11, a fact resulting from the broader context of transatlantic policies. Although the USA was pushing this coalition towards greater emphasis on democracy promotion, it at the same time provoked opposition to its practical policies. That led to the formation of a European approach to reform, particularly apparent in the different approaches to the Arab-Israeli peace process. Mr. Youngs disputed the EU's claims that its counter-terrorism policies focus on the underlying causes of terrorism and described them as rather realist power protection security measures.

Mr. Youngs stressed that the main difference between the US and EU approach is rhetorical. The USA talks of spreading freedom whilst the EU uses anodyne terms such as the rule of law, good governance and responsible administration. Although a growing number of European politicians speak more explicitly about democracy since 9/11, veiled critique of the Bush administration—such as “democracy cannot be imposed by force”—is ubiquitous in European discourse. Nonetheless, it does not say much about what can and should be done. Furthermore, there is no consensus about the structures to be supported within authoritarian regimes, only a widespread belief that democratisation need to happen from within. Mr. Youngs voiced his uncertainty over whether these questionable democratisation efforts have any long-term effect, in view of the fact that some aspects of European policy are inadvertently helping to stabilise the current regimes.

The Middle East receives less EU democracy assistance than Sub-Saharan Africa or Latin America. Unlike the USA, the Europeans have not significantly increased their funding to the region after 9/11. The main focus has remained social development and economic reform. In general, European democratisation efforts do not take into account specific obstacles to democracy in each country and the idea of positive conditionality as stipulated in ENP is not being satisfactorily implemented (Tunisia is one example). The notion of rewards conditionality is left vague and unspecific. Mr. Youngs concluded by stating that significant changes have not occurred since 9/11 and that the EU needs patience and insistence in persuading Arab leaders of the sincerity of its democratisation policies.

// RADWAN MASMOUDI

Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy, USA

Mr. Masmoudi saw most Arab countries being in the same situation as Eastern and Central European countries two decades ago and the USA having again the responsibility for freeing them from their oppressive governments. Most of these countries have discredited unpopular regimes whose only legitimacy is based on weapons. He echoed Mr. Abaza in suggesting that, in order to receive more EU and US support, the leaders of these regimes pretend to be preventing Islamist extremism although their real aim is to maintain the status quo. Mr. Masmoudi described illiteracy, unemployment and lack of perspective for the young generation as the real reasons behind desperation and anger in the Arab world.

He stressed that Islam has never been an impediment to democracy. Instead, democratic principles are integral to Quranic teachings and polls show that some 90 percent of the Middle Eastern population is in favour of democracy. According to Mr. Masmoudi, Arabs and Muslims are “hungry and eager for democracy”.

Urgent policy change is required, particularly concerning guidelines and criteria for categorizing regimes. Mr. Masmoudi suggested five guidelines: the number of political prisoners and cases of torture, the number of opposition parties, freedom of expression and free media, free and fair elections under international monitoring, and an independent judiciary system. These criteria should be used for decisions over the imposing of sanctions by the USA and the EU. Mr. Masmoudi urged for caution when supporting civil society in the Arab world as a majority of NGOs in the Arab world are set up by the government to sustain the status quo and divide the “real opposition movement.”

In regard to the challenge of dealing with Islamist political parties after 9/11, Mr. Masmoudi believed that the exclusion of this segment of society from the political process would be a mistake, even despite their partially undemocratic views. Once these parties are elected, he said, they become more pragmatic and less ideological. Dialogue between secularist and Islamist parties is necessary, as well as education regarding democracy. As a conclusion, Mr. Masmoudi insisted that the ideas of democracy are not new to the Arab world whilst the status quo of corrupt, unpopular and oppressive regimes is unsustainable. In his view, it is the duty of the free world to support transition towards democracy rather than maintain present corrupt regimes.

// MOHSEN MARZOUK

Freedom House, Tunisia

Mr. Marzouk concentrated on democracy transition processes in Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and the need of knowledge transfer into the region. He believed that the current situation, marked by unprecedented expansion of national and political freedoms in the region, is a sign of awareness that genuine democratic transition as well as ending the still existing foreign occupations is needed. A clear evidence for that is the UNDP Arab Human Development Report, a product of Arab expertise drawing attention to the region's severe deficits.

In reference to recent developments in the Middle East, Marzouk touched upon the Palestinian parliamentary elections and the victory of Hamas. He examined and criticised the European positions, which first decisively supported free elections and subsequently disavowed the victorious Islamist movement emerging from an election that had been undoubtedly free.

His intervention further focused on the importance of sharing Asian, Latin American and Eastern European democracy transition experience with Arab pro-democracy actors, as a methodology of democracy promotion in the MENA region. He elaborated on the modalities of such knowledge sharing and the type of beneficiaries who should be involved in the exchanges. To this aim, in Marzouk's view, a new capacity building methodology based up on activities such as study tours, exchanges, internships and translation of lacking materials should be developed. It should also be channelled through knowledge management networks such as Communities of Practices. As an example, he outlined the experience of Al Kawakibi Democracy Transition Center which has been founded recently to help building democracy-related expertise in MENA, based on knowledge sharing and experience transfer.

// EBERHARD RHEIN

European Policy Centre, Belgium

Mr. Rhein expressed his belief that there is no Arab exception, as the title of the panel might have suggested. He stated that the future of the Arab world would involve a type of democracy and the EU should act now toward that aim. In his pragmatic approach he rejected interventions in countries where the EU has no influence, such as the Gulf countries, including Iraq; these should be suspended for the next several years because of a lack of institutional links and missing expertise. The EU should instead

concentrate on the Barcelona process and utilise the decades of results from pushing for economic and trade reforms in those Mediterranean countries progressing towards democracy (Morocco, Jordan, Lebanon or Palestine). Bilateral meetings between heads of those states and EU leaders are needed more than public displays and events. In his view, the current machinery lacks both global and country specific strategies.

Mr. Rhein went on to stress that one must distinguish between countries such as Libya on the one hand, and Tunisia or Morocco on the other. The latter should receive more help where requested, including border and visa issues, so as to send a clear message that the EU is willing to give more to them than to other, less-well performing countries. This would be similar to what the EU has been doing on its Eastern front. Cautious and low-key punitive measures should be taken following the same logic, for example to stop issuing visas to those in Tunisia responsible for undemocratic measures. According to Mr. Rhein, steps possible in Belarus must be possible in Tunisia: the discreet downscaling of assistance and sending of specific signals to those responsible for hindering civil society.

He concluded by stressing the importance of free elections, and particularly municipal elections at this stage, as they are not as obnoxious for the authorities and sustainable democracy can be formed in local structures. Bringing democracy to the Middle East does not mean destroying local culture and eliminating religious aspects from society. Just as the post-war European integration was led by Christian-democratic parties, Islamic-democratic parties may play an important role in the future of the Middle East.

// DISCUSSION

The discussion and panellists' responses revolved around the theme of Islam's compatibility with democracy and effective strategies for democracy promotion in Muslim countries.

Henry Plater-Zyberk, UK Defence Academy, disagreed with Mr. Marzouk's presentation and pointed out that opposition to Hamas was not in response to their electoral victory, but rather to their proclamations against Israel. This was confirmed by Jana Hybášková as a former election observer in Palestine. Mr. Marzouk disagreed and said that many sanctions imposed by the West turned against the Palestinian people rather than Hamas. He pointed out the double standards applied to Hamas and Iran. The latter has trade links with the West and can afford to openly proclaim its goal of destroying Israel, while Hamas merely refuses to recognise Israel and is immediately sanctioned.

Mr. Plater-Zyberk quoted several passages from the Holy Quran about women's rights and the slaughter of Christians. Mr. Masmoudi countered by referring to the fact that the four largest Muslim countries (Bangladesh, Pakistan, Indonesia and Turkey) had elected female prime ministers, a situation yet to happen in the USA. Mr. Plater-Zyberk then went on to ask whether Islam was actually compatible with European liberal democracy. Mr. Masmoudi responded that the positive answer to this question had been elaborated in thousands of papers and studies, although some, particularly in the USA, still refuse to accept the compatibility. Extremist interpretations exist in all religions and the suggestion that Muslims may have to give up their religion to become democratic is dangerous. According to him, democrats need not be secular; secularism in the Arab world has been discredited by persons such as Saddam Hussein, Gamal Abdul Nasser or Hafiz Al-Asad. Mr. Kubba indicated that there is no difficulty with the Quranic text but rather with the minds interpreting it. After close examination, he continued, the core values of any religion are generally compatible with democracy. The problem arises only when it comes to culture, institutions and radical dogmatism.

Lord Dahrendorf asked whether participants believed that there was a viable and sustainable alternative to democracy. He also noted the importance of distinguishing between authoritarian and totalitarian rulers, Saddam Hussein representing the latter. Mr. Kubba replied that authoritarian regimes did not represent a major issue, as long as they provided a good standard of living for their people without internal or external security threats. This was a viable way for countries in the Gulf region where both security and living standards were sustainable within the conditions of a centralised authoritarian regime and oil-based economy, unlike elsewhere in the region. Mr. Rhein shared this view while Mr. Youngs argued that hybrid regimes were an important model not only for academics and that democracy should be seen as a process or a path, rather than the end product.

Ms. Hybášková commented on Mr. Marzouk's speech by saying that within the EU, there was no shortage of goodwill towards the democratisation of the Middle East. There was, however, a lack of know-how on who should be supported and how. Mr. Abdel Nour agreed that practical implementation, despite the huge European budget, lacks professionalism, experience and know-how.

Ms. Jünemann asked Mr. Kubba to explain the difference between the activity of the EU and NED and the added value of NED's approach. Mr. Kubba responded that NED, as a non-governmental institution, has a strategy and working relationships with its partners. Support is not limited to funding and is free of government or diplomatic pressures as well as of the inherent restraints of politics and state interests.

Ms. Hybášková asked whether there was a democratic solution in situations related to local elections in one-mandate constituencies, where one family has control over

the constituency despite a seemingly democratic election result. Mr. Marzouk agreed that the strategy of approaching local politics via municipal elections was not perfect, as some rural regions acted as “reserves of despotism”. Thus distinguishing between different types of local politics was necessary. Freedom of expression and protection for democracy defenders was primary and crucial in changing some regimes while experience transfer from both Eastern Europe and South America was also important. Mr. Rhein added that local politics was important only if there was a degree of decentralisation of power. It is vital that democracy begins at the base of the system, such as municipalities in Egypt, for example, which have financial autonomy.

PANEL V: DEMOCRATISATION NOW

// AGENDA FOR EUROPE

// CHAIR: JIŘÍ SCHNEIDER

Prague Security Studies Institute, Czech Republic

// IRIS KEMPE

Center for Applied Policy Research, Germany

Ms. Kempe focused her contribution on the situation in Eastern Europe and, moreover, the role of Russia. She started by pointing out the inspiration by Western values and norms that drove the 'rainbow' revolutions Georgia and Ukraine. She saw the desire to join Euro-Atlantic structures as one of the most significant motivations for the post-Soviet transition in these countries. Thus the goal of becoming an EU member is no longer limited to foreign policy declarations but forms a key component of the domestic reform agendas.

She suggested that the unexpected dynamism of democratisation in Eastern Europe exercise pressure on Western policymakers to develop solutions that go beyond the visions of an EU enlargement to 27 member states, partnership and cooperation with Russia, and a Neighbourhood Policy characterised by "everything but institutions". Despite the fact that the European Union after the French and Dutch referenda reached its current limits of 'deepening' and 'widening', ENP is an important but insufficient step toward guiding democratic developments in those Eastern European countries that desire a concrete prospect for EU membership. As an example, Ms. Kempe referred to an extensive report showing that two of such countries, Ukraine and Georgia, have made a considerable progress on the path of their democratic transformation. A decisive moment in their case, according to her, was free elections based on previous development of civil society and democratic opposition.

In regard to Russia, she stated a failure on the part of President Putin to influence the post-Soviet integration space through Russia-oriented personal networks, direct pressure, or economic dependency. At the same time, though, Russia remains an important actor in Europe as a whole. For the first time, Ms. Kempe indicated, Russia and the EU face the common challenge of managing the overlapping integration spaces of Russia's "near abroad" and the EU's New Neighbourhood. In general, she suggested, it might be time to proceed from a neighbourhood policy in the east toward a new 'Ostpolitik'.

// MARKUS MECKEL

Member of German Bundestag, Germany

The core of Mr. Meckel's speech dealt with the proposal of establishing an autonomous "European Foundation for Democracy" as a new instrument of European foreign policy. The Foundation should internationally promote the development of democracy, strong

civil society, the rule of law and protection of human rights. It should complement the current range of tools in EU foreign policy, allowing for flexible cooperation with the civil societies of other countries and support their role within those countries, thus promoting democratic development. That would, according to Mr. Meckel, rectify a deficit within the EU, whose current instruments are too unwieldy as to the complexity of application procedures and financial controlling, or the excessive lengths of waiting periods.

At the same time, the Foundation would lend weight to the Europeans' ambition to play an important role in the pursuit of the above aims in Europe and beyond, and would enhance the EU's visibility as an international political player. Mr. Meckel emphasised that the initiative is not a completely new concept, but follows up on preceding proposals made in the past years by various actors at the European level. The Foundation should be anchored as an institution established by the EU Council along with the CFSP High Representative and subjected to control of the European Parliament, so that it is directly linked to the Union. However, decisions on the disbursement of funds should be taken autonomously by the Foundation's internal bodies. Importantly, it should enable for flexible small-scale founding of projects.

Mr. Meckel suggested that the Foundation be funded by lump sums from the European budget but should remain open to further contributions by third parties such as the EU member states or other foundations. It should be possible to determine certain proportions of the Foundation's budget to be allocated to certain countries, regions, or issues. Mr. Meckel also elaborated on the general importance of pro-active democracy promotion and spoke about the situation of Germany and its role in these efforts.

// MARC SCHADE-POULSEN

Euro-Med Human Rights Network, Denmark

Mr. Schade-Poulsen acknowledged the fact that the European Union has over the past decade developed a number of human rights instruments that bear importance for the democratisation of Europe's partner countries in the southern and eastern Mediterranean. Nevertheless, according to him, it is due to the resistance from many of those countries' governments that the pro-democracy efforts do not have a truly visible impact. On the other hand, the policies and instruments available to the EU are not consistently used. An explanation of this situation must take into account a lack of political will on the part of the governments of some EU member states, as well as, unfortunately, a lack of policy coherence within the EU institutions themselves.

Mr. Schade-Poulsen further focused on an overview of the main democratisation instruments and presented his thoughts over how these tools can be instrumental for moving the democratisation processes forward in a constructive way. In doing that,

he was able to draw from his experience of leading the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, an NGO platform focused on promoting democracy and human rights in the region. He stressed the need for unambiguous benchmarking of progress that is made by individual partner countries to the goal of bringing shared democratic values into reality. In addition, he called for a greater measure of transparency and involvement of civil society on all sides.

// DISCUSSION

Ms. Belitser, Pylyp Orlyk Institute for Democracy Ukraine, referred to the GUAM countries (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova) saying they have demonstrated the desire for and move towards democracy. Therefore, she continued, GUAM countries should be part of a special programme that the EU differentiates from ENP. Ms. Kempe responded by stating her support for democratic initiatives in GUAM countries. Such bottom-up regional initiatives are, according to her, the correct way rather than a top-down structure of dubious benefits.

A number of participants brought up the Foundation for the Future as part of the Democratic Assistance Dialogue. All members of the G8 group and other countries including some Arab states have contributed considerable money to the foundation. Its main goal is the democratisation of the region, but the foundation lacks national strategies, timelines and progress monitoring capacities.

Ms. Kempe, responding to comments on her speech, admitted her mistake of not having included Moldova in her presentation, since the country is obviously interesting to some EU member states, notably Germany, including the potential conclusion of the Stability Agreement and considerations over the country's EU membership perspective. Nonetheless, this will depend on the development of the Transnistria conflict. On the European level, a unified position is still lacking, despite the existing position of the European Commission.

Mr. Schade-Poulsen from the Euro-Med Human Rights Network asked whether the European Commission could efficiently evaluate progress made by the neighbour countries without allowing for enough transparency and clear timelines, and how European support will be distributed. Mr. Rhein, European Policy Centre, remarked that there was no choice but to set up an independent agency – the Foundation for Democracy – to manage funding for this area. Political scrutiny was inevitable and clear guidelines were needed, as well as a new approach to allocating funds, unlike the mechanism used for funding scientific research projects.

Mr. Meckel was asked to elaborate upon the proposal for a European NED-type foundation, its role, safeguards and accountabilities. Furthermore, how will it be guaranteed that no single EU country uses the foundation to pursue its own objectives? In his reply, Mr. Meckel referred to the need of new and clear control methods established by the European Parliament, rather than via the Commission, so that bureaucratic restrictions are not inherited by the new foundation. Sufficient control and financial accountability are essential but there also need to be flexible ways of quickly disbursing small amounts for operational purposes. Concerning the balance of interests, Mr. Meckel stressed that the range of supported subjects should be varied enough to benefit as many parties as possible.

Ana Rudico commented on the EU's lack of unified voice, the application of discriminatory policies and selective aid strategies.

**LIST OF SPEAKERS,
CHAIRPERSONS
AND
INTERNATIONAL
PARTICIPANTS**

//

Khairi Abaza	Senior Fellow, Center for Liberty in the Middle East (CLIME) USA/Egypt
Ayman Abdel Nour	Editor and Publisher, All For Syria Magazine Syria
H.E. Giorgi Baramidze	State Minister on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration Georgia
Nataliya Belitser	Research Fellow, Pylyp Orlyk Institute for Democracy Ukraine
Annegret Bendiek	Research Associate, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) Germany
Antonín Berdych	President, Association for International Affairs Czech Republic
Roberta Bonazzi	Director, European Foundation for Democracy Belgium
Erhard Busek	Special Coordinator of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, Council of the EU Austria
Lord Dahrendorf	Research Professor, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung Germany
Peter Fischer-Bollin	Head of Department, Konrad Adenauer Foundation Germany
Tamar Gamkrelidze	New Generation – New Initiative Georgia
Stefan Gehroid	Director, Konrad Adenauer Foundation Prague Czech Republic

Stepan Grigoryan	Analytical Centre on Globalisation and Regional Cooperation Armenia
Grzegorz Gromadzki	Stefan Batory Foundation Poland
Petr Hladík	Member of Policy Unit, Council of the European Union
Hana Hubáčková	Director-General of Territorial Section I (Europe), Ministry of Foreign Affairs Czech Republic
Jana Hybášková	Member, Foreign Affairs Committee, European Parliament Czech Republic
Paweł Kazanecki	Eastern European Democratic Centre Poland
Andrus KLIKUNOU	Party BNF International Commission Member Belarus
Marianne Kneuer	Visiting Professor, University of Erfurt Germany
Agnieszka Komorowska	Stefan Batory Foundation Poland
Alena Makouskaja	World Association of the Belarusians „Homeland“
Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués	Researcher, Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona Spain
Annette Jünemann	Professor, Helmut-Schmidt-Universität Hamburg Germany

Iris Kempe	Senior Researcher, Center for Applied Policy Research Germany
Laith Kubba	Director, National Endowment for Democracy USA
Anne-Marie Le Gloannec	Director of Research, Centre d'études et de recherches internationales (CERI) France
Siarhej Mackevich	Assembly of Belarusian Prodemocratic NGOs Belarus
Alena Makouskaja	President, Homeland Association Belarus
Petr Mareš	Member of Advisory Board, Association for International Affairs Czech Republic
Mohsen Marzouk	Regional Director, Freedom House Tunisia
Radwan Masmoudi	President, Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy USA
Markus Meckel	Member, Foreign Affairs Committee, The German Bundestag Germany
Hugues Mingarelli	European Commission EU
Edvard Oustrata	Vice-President, Senate of the Parliament Czech Republic
Petr Pithart	1st Vice-President, Senate of the Parliament Czech Republic

Henry Plater-Zyberk	Senior Analyst, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom UK
Tomáš Pojar	Deputy Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Czech Republic
Marc Schade-Poulsen	Executive Director, Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN) Denmark
Ana Rudico	Institute for Public Policy, Moldova
Jiří Schneider	PASS Coordinator, Prague Security Studies Institute Czech Republic
Jiří Šedivý	Minister of Defence Czech Republic
Jan Šnidauf	Chairman of the Board, Research Centre, Association for International Affairs Czech Republic
Eberhard Rhein	Senior Policy Advisor, European Policy Centre Belgium
Luboš Veselý	Director of the Research Centre, Association for International Affairs Czech Republic
Richard Youngs	Co-Director and Coordinator, Democratisation Programme, FRIDE Spain

ORGANISER

**// ASSOCIATION FOR
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS**

// ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

The Association for International Affairs (established 1997 in Prague) is a non-profit, non-governmental organisation whose aim is to conduct research and educate about international relations and foreign affairs. The Research Centre at the Association for International Affairs (AMO) was established in October 2003 to coordinate the AMO's research activities. The Research Centre aims at identifying and researching issues regarding the foreign policy of the Czech Republic and its position in today's world. The Centre provides independent expert analysis, supports discussion at different levels and proposes possible policy solutions.

Within the Research Centre the following programmes have been established to coordinate the work of various research projects and working groups:

- European Programme's aim is to create and cultivate the public debate on European issues and conduct quality research, editorial and discussion projects.
- Eastern European Programme focuses on the research of the European countries of the former Soviet Union. Main fields of interests are issues, which are highly important for the Czech Republic from a political, economical and security point of view. Attention is also paid to the broader context of political, social and economical transformation processes in this region.
- Development Programme carries out research projects in the field of Development cooperation, the Czech Republic's relations with the Third World countries, Development education and others.
- Programme of Atlantic Security Studies (PASS) has been realized in cooperation with the Prague Security Studies Institute. Information about the PASS' activities is available at www.pass-prague.cz.

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THE RESEARCH CENTRE

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Work of the Research Centre is supported by the Open Society Fund Prague. More information can be found at www.amo.cz

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DEMOCRATISATION IN EU EXTERNAL POLICIES INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE PRAGUE, 22-23 SEPTEMBER, 2006

The international conference „Democratisation in EU External Policies: Objective or Side-effect?“ was held in the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic in Prague, 22–23 September 2006. The realisation of the conference was made possible by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation Prague and other partners.

The event brought together academics, politicians, officials, policy-makers, and representatives of European institutions, as well as people from the NGO sector in the EU, its eastern and southern neighbours and the USA. The panels and following discussions covered many aspects of EU external policies such as, notably, the European Neighbourhood Policy and also broader policies of democratisation in Europe’s neighbourhood and beyond. The opportunity for policy makers and representatives from specific countries to meet and discuss their experience of the EU’s democratisation efforts both provided an insight into the policies and gave a first-hand account of how these efforts are being perceived in countries outside the Union.

This publication contains abridged summaries of all sessions and following discussions that were delivered at the conference, and an unabridged version of the keynote speech by Lord Dahrendorf.
